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Abstract
Entropy regularization has been extensively adopted to improve the efficiency, the stability,
and the convergence of algorithms in reinforcement learning. This paper analyzes both quan-
titatively and qualitatively the impact of entropy regularization for Mean Field Game (MFG)
with learning in a finite time horizon. Our study provides a theoretical justification that entropy
regularization yields time-dependent policies and, furthermore, helps stabilizing and accelerat-
ing convergence to the game equilibrium. In addition, this study leads to a policy-gradient
algorithm for exploration in MFG. Under this algorithm, agents are able to learn the optimal
exploration scheduling, with stable and fast convergence to the game equilibrium.
1 Introduction
Reinforcement learning (RL) is one of the three basic machine learning paradigms, alongside super-
vised learning and unsupervised learning. RL is learning via trial and error, through interactions
with an environment and possibly with other agents; in RL, an agent takes an action and receives
a reinforcement signal in terms of a numerical reward, which encodes the outcome of her action. In
order to maximize the accumulated reward over time, the agent learns to select her actions based
on her past experiences (exploitation) and/or by making new choices (exploration).
Exploration and exploitation are the essence of RL. Exploration provides opportunities to im-
prove from current sub-optimal solutions to the ultimate global optimal one, yet is time consuming
and computationally expensive as over-exploration may impair the convergence to the optimal so-
lution. Meanwhile, pure exploitation, i.e., myopically picking the current solution based solely on
past experience, though easy to implement, tends to yield sub-optimal global solutions. Therefore,
an appropriate trade-off between exploration-exploitation is crucial for RL algorithms design to
improve the learning and the optimization procedure.
Entropy regularization. One common approach to balance the exploration-exploitation in RL
is to introduce entropy regularization [1, 18, 20]. In RL setting with more than one agent, there are
two major sources of uncertainties: the unknown environment and the actions of the other agents.
As such, Shannon entropy and cross-entropy are two natural choices for entropy regularization:
the former quantifies the information gain of exploring the environment while the latter measures
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the benefit from exploring the actions of other agents. This information-theoretic perspective of
exploration has been well understood in single-agent RL, see for instance [8, 10, 18, 20, 23].
However, there is virtually no theoretical study on the role of entropy regularization in multi-
agent RL (MARL), with the exception of [2]. Indeed, most existing studies are empirical, demon-
strating convergence improvement and variance reduction when entropy regularization is added.
For instance, [12] showed via empirical analysis that policy features can be learned directly from
pure observations of other agents and that the non-stationarity of the environment can be reduced
with addition of the cross-entropy; [11] applied the cross-entropy regularization to demonstrate the
convergence of fictitious play in a discrete-time model with a finite number of agents while [22]
used the cross-entropy loss to train the prediction of other agents’ actions via observations of their
behavior. The only theoretical work so far can be found in [2] with an infinite horizon setting in
which a regularized Q-learning algorithm for stationary discrete-time mean field game was proposed
along with its convergence analysis. Still, the problem remains open in the finite time horizon cases,
which arises often in many applications.
Optimal exploration scheduling. Another major challenge for both single-agent RL and MARL
is exploration efficiency. In practice, there are various heuristic designs of explorations for MARL,
including adding random noise in the parameter space [21], the approach of ε-greedy [27], and the
method with softmax [14]. However, there is no theoretical validation of these approaches.
Recently, time-invariant Gaussian exploration were applied to single-agent RL ([13], [19], and
[24]) and time-dependent “optimal exploration scheduling” was derived for single-agent mean-variance
portfolio selection problem in [25]. In these works, the degree of exploration was characterized by
the variance of the Gaussian distribution, and the term “optimal exploration scheduling” was coined
for the time-dependent variance of the Gaussian distribution.
Exploration schemes are inherently time-dependent, as it is necessary to balance the free explo-
ration at the initial phase and the greedy control policy towards terminal time. Yet, it seems that
there is no existing work on analyzing such time-dependent learning policies for MARL, empirical
or theoretical.
Our work. In this paper, we propose to study entropy regularization for MARL with a large
population, namely, within the framework of the mean field game (MFG). This transition from
MARL to MFG with learning is critical to avoid the curse of dimensionality in MARL.
We analyze both quantitatively and qualitatively the impact of entropy regularization in MFG
with learning in a finite time horizon. We adopt two different entropies: first the Shannon entropy
and then a combination of Shannon entropy and the cross-entropy which we call the enhanced
entropy.
• We derive explicit Nash equilibrium (NE) solutions (Theorems 2 and 4) for a class of linear-
quadratic (LQ) stochastic games. Our study provides a theoretical justification that entropy
regularization yields time-dependent policies and, furthermore, helps stabilizing and acceler-
ating convergence to the game equilibrium.
• This theoretical study enables us to design a policy-gradient algorithm for MFG with learning.
Under this algorithm, agents are able to learn efficiently the optimal exploration scheduling
in an unknown environment and with a large group of competing agents. The convergence to
the game equilibrium is stable and fast when appropriate exploration rates are chosen.
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Additional related works. Our algorithm is inspired by the recent success of policy-gradient
method for single-agent LQ regulators [6], In addition, there is a concurrent work on the global
convergence of policy gradient for MFG [26], yet without exploration. We mention here also recent
works on two-agent zero-sum LQ games [28] and the LQ mean field control problem with common
noise [5].
Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the mathematical
framework for MFG with learning, Section 3 focuses on analyzing the impact of Shannon entropy
and the enhanced entropy in a class of LQ games, and Section 4 proposes a policy-gradient based
algorithm and entropy regularization, and provides its numerical performance.
2 Mathematical Formulation
We start with the mathematical formulation of the MFG with learning.
Key ideas. There are several key components for the formulation.
The first component is the aggregation idea from the theory of MFG to address the issue of
curse of dimensionality in MARL. Specifically, it is to consider N agents, and assume that they are
all identical, indistinguishable and interchangeable, and that interactions among them are based
on the macroscopic information, which is the empirical state distribution and action distribution
of the other agents. This allows us to work instead with a representative agent i, her state Xit ,
her policy piit at time t ∈ [0, T ], and her interaction with other agents through the macroscopic
information. Since Xi depends on other agents only through the empirical measure, we may then
consider both the population state distribution and action distribution if such limits exist when
N →∞. Moreover, the subscript i can be dropped and one can focus on a representative agent in
this MFG formulation since all agents are assumed to be identical and indistinguishable.
The second component is how to model learning and exploration via the notion of randomized
policies, known in the control literature as relaxed controls and in game theory as mixed strategies,
respectively. That is, policies, say pit, from the representative agent such that pit ∈ P(U), with
P(U) a probability distribution over an action space U . Mathematically, this means that pit ∈ P(U)
if and only if ∫
U
pit(u)du = 1 and pit(u) ≥ 0 a.e. on U. (2.1)
The third ingredient is the entropy regularization, which is adopted to encourage exploration.
For this, we will use both the Shannon entropy, and the cross-entropy, denoted by HSE and HCE ,
respectively (see (2.5) and (2.6)).
Controlled state process with randomized policies. We incorporate the above components
in a finite horizon setting [0, T ], 0 < T < ∞. For this, we denote µ := {µs, t ≤ s ≤ T} to be the
flow of population state distribution with µs ∈ P(R) and α := {αs, t ≤ s ≤ T} to be the flow of
population action distribution with αs(·;x) ∈ P(U), starting from time t ∈ [0, T ]. Occasionally, α
and µ will also be called the mean field information.
Next we define the controlled state process for the representative agent. Given t ∈ [0, T ] and
deterministic and exogenous flows, say α and µ with µt = ν, the representative agent adopts a
randomized policy pi = {pis ∈ P(U), s ∈ [t, T ]} over an admissible policy set A (to be specified
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below). Then, following the paradigm recently proposed in [24], the controlled state process is
assumed to follow
dXpis =
(∫
U
b(s,Xpis , µs, αs, u)pis(u)du
)
ds+
(√∫
U
σ2(s,Xpis , µs, αs, u)pis(u)du
)
dWs,(2.2)
Xpit = ξ ∼ ν, µt = ν, s ∈ [t, T ].
Here W = {Wt}0≤t≤T is a standard Brownian motion defined on a filtered probability space
(Ω,F , {Ft}0≤t≤T ,P), with {Ft}0≤t≤T satisfying the usual conditions; ν ∈ P2(U) is the distri-
bution of the initial state; ξ is a random variable independent of W and F0-measurable; and
b, σ : [0, T ]×R×P(U)×P(U)×U ↪→ R are, respectively, the drift and volatility of the underlying
state process.
Note that the particular form of the state process (2.2) is a consequence of the aggregation of
X̂us over action us ∈ U , with
dX̂us = b
(
s, X̂us , µs, αs, us
)
ds+ σ
(
s, X̂us , µs, αs, us
)
dWs.
Such policies us ∈ U are also called pure strategies in game theory. Pure strategies and mixed
strategies are closely related as discussed in [24]. Indeed, u = {us, s ∈ [0, T ]} can be regarded as a
Dirac distribution pi = {pis(u), s ∈ [0, T ]} where pis(·) = δus(·) ∈ U . (See [24] for more discussions
on this connection).
Game payoff with entropy regularization. The objective of the representative agent is to
maximize her payoff function J and solve for
V (t |µ, α) = sup
pi∈A
J(t, pi |µ, α), (2.3)
where the entropy-regularized payoff is defined as
J(t, pi |µ, α) = E
[∫ T
t
(∫
U
(
r(s,Xs, µs, αs, u)pis(u)du+ λSEHSE(pis) + λCEHCE(pis, αs, µs)
))
ds
+g(XT , µT , αT )
∣∣∣µ, α] . (2.4)
The Shannon entropy HSE and cross-entropy HCE are defined as
HSE(pis) = −
∫
U
pis(u) lnpis(u)du, pis ∈ P(U), (2.5)
HCE(pis, αs, µs) = −
∫
U
pis(u)
∫ (
lnαs(u;x)
)
µs(dx)du, pis ∈ P(U). (2.6)
In addition, r : [0, T ] × R × P(U) × P(U) × U ↪→ R and g : [0, T ] × R × P(U) × P(U) ↪→ R are
the running reward and terminal reward functions of the representative agent, while λSE > 0 is the
(temperature) parameter to control the degree of self-exploration and λCE ≥ 0 is the (temperature)
parameter to control the degree of exploration on other agents’ actions. From an information-
theoretic perspective, λSEHSE and λCEHCE quantify the information gain from exploring the
unknown environment and the policies chosen by the other agents.
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Observable quantities. In a game with learning, the functions b, σ, r and g are unknown. The
representative agent takes actions while interacting with (the continuum) of the other agents. This
interaction takes several rounds.
In each round starting from time 0, she observes {αs}s≤t, {µs}s≤t and {Xpis }s≤t at time t ∈ [0, T ];
the reward will not be revealed until time T , the end of each round; at time T , she will observe the
realized cumulative reward ĵ (0, pi|α, µ) with
ĵ (0, pi|α, µ) :=
∫ T
t
(∫
U
(
r(s,Xpis , µs, αs, u)pis(u)du+ λSEHSE(pis) + λCEHCE(pis, αs, µs)
))
ds
+g(XpiT , µT , αT ),
which is associated with the corresponding single trajectory {Xpis }s∈[0,T ] under policy pi and the
population behavior {αs}s∈[0,T ], {µs}s∈[0,T ] in this round. Note that ĵ (0, pi|α, µ) is random.
Admissible policies. A policy pi ∈ A(t, µ, α) is admissible if
(i) for each s ∈ [t, T ], pis ∈ P(U) a.s.;
(ii) for each A ∈ B(U) with B(U) being the Borel algebra on U , {∫A pis(u)du, s ∈ [t, T ]} is Ft-
progressively measurable;
(iii) the SDE (2.4) admits a unique strong solution Xpi := {Xpis , s ∈ [t, T ]}, with pi used;
(iv) the expectation on the right hand side of (2.4) is finite;
(v) there exists a measurable function pi : [t, T ]× R→ P(U) such that
P
(
pis(du) = pis(du;X
pi
s ), ∀s ∈ [t, T ]
)
= 1.
Note that (v) implies the admissible policy is Markovian, i.e., closed-loop policy in feedback
form.
Alternative formulation of the MFG with learning. We note that problem (2.3) treats the
initial state ξ as a genuine source of randomness, in addition to the stochasticity from the Brownian
motion W . Frequently, the following alternative interpretation, with a deterministic initial state x
is useful for solving analytically the MFG. Specifically, let
V˜ (t, x |µ, α) := sup
pi∈A
J˜(t, x |pi, µ, α)
:= E
[∫ T
t
(∫
U
(r(Xpis , µs, αs, u)pis(u)du+ λSEHSE(pis) + λCEHCE(pis, αs, µs))
)
ds
+g(XpiT , µT , αT )
∣∣∣Xpit = x, µ, α] , (2.7)
subject to
dXpis =
(∫
U
b(s,Xpis , µs, αs, u)pis(u)du
)
ds+
(√∫
U
σ2(s,Xpis , µs, αs, u)pis(u)du
)
dWs,(2.8)
Xpit = x, µt = ν, s ∈ [t, T ].
Then, it easily follows that
Eξ∼ν [V˜ (t, ξ |µ, α)] = V (t |µ, α).
While conceptually this approach is less general, it is frequently used -as in [16] and therein - to
solve the MFG explicitly.
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Nash Equilibrium (NE) for MFG with learning. To analyze game (2.4), we adopt the well-
known NE criterion.
Definition 1 (NE for MFG). For game (2.4) with an initial state distribution ν and state pro-
cess (2.8), an agent-population profile (pi∗, µ∗, α∗) := {(pi∗s , µ∗s, α∗s), t ≤ s ≤ T} is called NE if the
following conditions hold:
A. (Single-agent-side) For the fixed population state-action distribution (µ∗, α∗) and any policy
pi,
J(t, pi |µ∗, α∗) ≥ J(t, pi∗ |µ∗, α∗).
B. (Population-side) pi∗s(u;x) = α∗s(u;x), for all x ∈ R. In addition, PX∗s = µ∗s for any s ∈ [t, T ],
where X∗ solves (2.8) when policy pi∗ is adopted with the initial population state distribution
µ∗t = ν.
Given an NE (pi∗, µ∗, α∗),
V (t |µ∗, α∗) := J(t, pi∗ |µ∗, α∗) = max
pi∈A
J(t, pi |µ, α∗)
is called a game value associated with this NE.
Given (µ∗, α∗), condition A captures the optimality of pi∗ while condition B ensures the con-
sistency of the solution so that the state and action flows of the single agent match those of the
population. Note that uniqueness of NE for MFG is, in general, rare when mixed strategies are
allowed (see, for example, [15]).
3 Shannon Entropy and Enhanced Entropy for MFG with Learning
Given the mathematical formulation for MFG with learning in Section 2, we analyze the information
theoretic gain for two types of entropies: Shannon entropy HSE and enhanced entropy, which is a
linear combination of Shannon entropy and cross-entropy λSEHSE + λCEHCE with temperature
parameters λSE and λCE . We study the impact of this entropy regularization within a class of LQ
games in a finite time horizon. LQ games are the building blocks of stochastic games and often
bring critical insights from their closed-form solutions ([3, 4]). In particular, we will see that the
LQ games we analze yield time-dependent optimal policies, with time-dependent Gaussian efficient
explorations.
3.1 Game with Shannon Entropy
We start with the case of using only Shannon entropy for exploration, namely
VSE(t |µ) := sup
pi∈A
JSE(t, pi |µ)
:= sup
pi∈A
E
[∫ T
t
(∫
R
−Q
2
(Xpis −ms)2pis(u)du+ λSEHSE(pis)
)
ds −Q¯
2
(XpiT −mT )2
∣∣∣∣µ] ,
subject to
dXpis =
(∫
R
(A(ms −Xpis ) +Bu)pis(u)du
)
ds+D
(√∫
R
u2pis(u)du
)
dWs, X
pi
t = ξ ∼ ν.
(MFG-SE)
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Here µt = ν, and ms =
∫
xµs(dx) (s ∈ [t, T ]). We assume A > 0, Q > 0, Q¯ > 0, and λSE > 0. We
take the action space to be U = R, and without loss of generality, B > 0 and D > 0.
We remark that α does not appear in the game formulation (MFG-SE). This is because when
only Shannon entropy is incorporated, there is no interaction between the policy of the representative
agent and the population action distribution α := {αs}s∈[t,T ].
There are two types of rewards in this game: the running reward −Q2 (Xpis −ms)2 that penalizes
any deviation from the current average state of the population at time s ∈ [t, T ], and the terminal
reward − Q¯2 (XpiT −mT )2 that penalizes deviation from average state of the population at the termi-
nal time T . There are also two types of interactions: the real time interactions A(ms − Xpis ) and
Q
2 (X
pi
s −ms)2 for s ∈ [t, T ] and the interaction at the terminal time Q¯2 (XpiT −mT )2.
Next, we present one of the main results herein which provides an explicit NE solution.
Theorem 2 (MFG-SE). Let m∗ = E[ξ] and
V˜SE(t, x) = −η
SE
t
2
(x−m∗)2 + γSEt , (3.1)
with
ηSEt = Q¯ exp
(
−
(
2A+
B2
D2
)
(T − t)
)
+
Q
2A+ B
2
D2
(
1− exp
(
−
(
2A+
B2
D2
)
(T − t)
))
> 0 (3.2)
and
γSEt =
λSE
2
ln
(
2piλSE
D2
)
(T − t)−
∫ T
t
λSE
2
ln
(
ηSEz
)
dz.
Then,
V ∗SE(t) = Eξ∼ν [V˜SE(t, ξ)]
is a game value of (MFG-SE) associated with the NE policy
piSE∗s (u;x) = N
(
B(m∗ − x)
D2
,
λSE
D2ηSEs
)
, s ∈ [t, T ]. (3.3)
The corresponding controlled state process under (3.3) is the unique solution of the SDE,
dX∗s =
(
A+
B2
D2
)
(m∗ −X∗s )ds+
√(
B(m∗ −X∗s )
D
)2
+
λSE
ηSEs
dWs, (3.4)
X∗t = ξ ∼ ν, s ∈ [t, T ].
In addition, the mean state of the population under policy (3.3) is time-independent, i.e.,
m∗s = E[X∗s ] = m∗, s ∈ [t, T ]. (3.5)
Remark 3. Theorem 2 provides important guidance for exploration from an information-theoretic
perspective. It suggests that, with Shannon entropy regularization, the associated optimal policy pro-
cess piSE∗s (u;X∗t ) implied from (3.3) is Gaussian, mean-reverting and with time-dependent variance.
This is useful for MARL algorithmic design as the agent can now focus on a much smaller class of
policies
pis(u;x) ∼ N
(
M̂(ms − x), σ̂2s
)
, (3.6)
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with ms =
∫
R xµs(dx), M̂ some scalar, and σ̂
2 = {σ̂2s}s∈[t,T ] a variance exploration process. Mean-
while, she can improve her estimate on M̂ and σ̂2 of the policy while interacting with the system
and other agents and observing the outcome at the end of each round of play. Indeed, notice that
the controlled state process becomes
dXpis =
(
A+BM̂
)
(ms −Xpis )ds+
(
D
√
M̂2(ms −Xpis )2 + σ̂2s
)
dWs, (3.7)
with Xt = ξ. Thus, the following simple corollary will be useful for MARL (see also more details in
Section 4 where this result is used for algorithm design).
Corollary 3.1. If the representative agent follows policy (3.6) under a given mean field information
µ = {µs}s∈[t,T ], then the payoff is given by
JSE(t, pi |µ) = −Q
2
∫ T
t
(
φ2s − 2ms m̂s +m2s
)
ds
+
λSE
2
∫ T
t
log
(
2pieσ̂2s
)
ds− Q¯
2
(
φ2T − 2mT m̂T +m2T
)
, (3.8)
where
φ2s = e
(2K̂+D2M̂2)(s−t)
(
E[ξ2] +
∫ s
t
e−D
2M̂2(z−t)d(z)dz
)
,
with
d(s) = −2E[ξ] e−K̂(s−t)K̂ms+
(∫ s
t
e−K̂(z−t)K̂mzdz
)
e−K̂(s−t)K̂ms+e−2K̂(s−t)D2
(
M̂2m2s − 2M̂2msm̂s + σ̂2s
)
ms =
∫
R
µs(x)dx, m̂s = e
K̂(s−t)E[ξ] +
∫ s
t
eK̂(s−z)K̂mz dz, and K̂ = −
(
A+BM̂
)
.
Next, we analyze the game with an additional cross-entropy regularization.
3.2 Game with Enhanced Entropy (Linear Combination of Shannon Entropy
and Cross-entropy)
The objective of this game is to find
VEE(t |µ, α) := sup
pi∈A
JEE(t, pi |µ, α)
:= sup
pi∈A
E
[∫ T
t
(
−Q
2
(Xpis −ms)2 + λSEHSE(pis) + λCEHCE(pis, αs, µs)
)
ds
−Q¯
2
(XpiT −mT )2
∣∣∣∣ α, µ] ,
subject to
dXs =
(∫
R
(A(ms −Xpis ) +Bu)pis(u)du
)
ds+D
√∫
R
u2pis(u)dudWs, X
pi
t = ξ ∼ ν. (MFG-EE)
Here µt = ν, ms =
∫
xµs(dx), s ∈ [t, T ], and we assume λSE > 0, λCE ≥ 0, Q > 0, Q¯ > 0, and
A > 0. Without loss of generality, we further set B > 0 and D > 0.
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Theorem 4 (MFG-EE). Let m∗ = E[ξ] and
V˜EE(t, x) = −η
EE
t
2
(x−m∗)2 + γEEt , (3.9)
with
ηEEt = Q¯ exp
(
−
(
2A+
B2
D2
λSE + λCE
λSE
)
(T − t)
)
+
Q
2A+ B
2
D2
λSE+λCE
λSE
(
1− exp
(
−
(
2A+
B2
D2
λSE + λCE
λSE
)
(T − t)
))
, (3.10)
where ηEEt > 0, for t ∈ [0, T ], and
γEEt =
λSE + λCE
2
ln
(
2pi(λSE + λCE)
D2
)
(T − t)−
∫ T
t
λSE + λCE
2
ln(ηz)dz
+
∫ T
t
λCE
2
B2ηz(λSE + λCE)
D2λ2SE
κzdz,
with
κEEs = e
(2K+M)(s−t)Var[ξ] +
∫ s
t
e(M+2K)(s−z)
λSE + λCE
ηz
dz, (3.11)
and
K = −
(
A+
B2
D2
)
λSE + λCE
λSE
, M =
(
B
D
λSE + λCE
λSE
)2
.
Then,
V ∗EE(t) := Eξ∼ν
[
V˜EE(t, ξ |µ∗, α∗)
]
is a game value of (MFG-EE), with the associated NE policy
piEE∗s (u;x) = N
(
λSE + λCE
λSE
B(m∗ − x)
D2
,
λSE + λCE
D2ηEEs
)
. (3.12)
Furthermore, the optimal controlled state process X∗s under (3.12) is the unique solution of the SDE,
dX∗s =
(
A+
λSE + λCE
λSE
B2
D2
)
(m∗ −X∗s )ds
+D
√(
A+
λSE + λCE
λSE
B2
D2
)2
(X∗s −m)2 +
λSE + λCE
D2ηEEs
dWs, (3.13)
X∗t = ξ ∼ ν, s ∈ [t, T ].
In addition, µ∗t = PX∗t , α
∗
s(u;x) = pi
EE∗
s (u;x), and the mean state of the population under policy
(3.12) is time independent, i.e.,
m∗s = E[X∗s ] = m∗, s ∈ [t, T ]. (3.14)
Before providing detailed proofs and derivation of these NE solutions, a few remarks are in place.
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3.3 Discussion.
In both games, with either only Shannon entropy (MFG-SE) or with the additional cross-entropy
(MFG-EE), there are several similarities.
• The form of the optimal policies (3.3) and (3.12) suggests that Gaussian exploration is optimal
when entropy regularization is introduced in MFG with learning. This is consistent with recent
works of [24, 25] for continuous-time single-agent RL and is also supported by empirical studies
of [17] and [21].
• Both means of the optimal policy process pi∗SE(u,X∗t ) implied from policy (3.3) and the optimal
policy process pi∗EE(u,X
∗
t ) implied from (3.12) are influenced by the mean field interaction and
the current state of the representative agent, while their variances are time-dependent.
In addition, the strength of mean reversion is quantified by the coefficient B
D2
, which indicates
that a smaller variance signifies less uncertainty in the game, hence a faster mean reverting
policy.
• Equation (3.2) for ηSEs and equation (3.10) for ηCEs suggest that when s is sufficiently small, the
term Q
2A+B
2
D2
(
1− exp
(
−
(
2A+ B
2
D2
)
(T − s)
))
dominates ηSEs , whereas ηEEs is dominated by
Q
2A+B
2
D2
λSE+λCE
λSE
(
1− exp
(
−
(
2A+ B
2
D2
λSE+λCE
λSE
)
(T − s)
))
. Thus, when s is small, the cost
of exploration is low and the representative agent has more incentive to explore in upcoming
times.
Conversely, when s is sufficiently large and especially when s ∼ T , ηSEs is dominated by the
term Q¯ exp
(
−
(
2A+ B
2
D2
)
(T − s)
)
, whereas Q¯ exp
(
−
(
2A+ B
2
D2
λSE+λCE
λSE
)
(T − s)
)
domi-
nates ηEEs . Thus, the cost of exploration increases as s approaches T . This implies that
the agent is more sensitive to the terminal reward and explore less when the game approaches
termination.
• In the very special case A = Q = 0, there is no intermediate payoff. Then, the variances of
pi∗SE and pi
∗
EE decrease when s increases, implying more exploration at the very beginning and
less towards the very end.
Despite the above similarities, there is an important difference:
• Shannon entropy and the cross-entropy affect the opitmal policy pi∗SE and pi∗EE differently.
Indeed, the mean of the optimal policy process pi∗EE(u,X
∗
t ) depends on the ratio between
λCE and λSE , while λSE and λCE impact the variance of pi∗EE(u,X
∗
t ) through both
λCE
λSE
and λSE + λCE . In particular, with the additional cross-entropy, one will explore more and,
consequently, the learning procedure would converge faster.
3.4 Derivations and Proofs of Main Results
The derivation of the solutions is based on the classical fixed-point approach for game (2.7). It
consists of three steps:
• Step 1: Fix a population state-action distribution (µ, α) and an initial state x. Then, solving
the MFG is reduced to solving a stochastic control problem with randomized policies (relaxed
controls).
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• Step 2: Let Xpi,xs be the controlled state process under policy pi from the initial state x in
Step 1. Update α′s(·, y) = pis(·, y) for all y ∈ R and s ∈ [t, T ]. Denote Xpi,ξs the controlled
state process under pi from some random initial state ξ ∼ ν. Then, update µ′s = PXξ,pis .
• Step 3: Repeat Steps 1 and 2 until (µ′, α′) converges.
Note that there is no guarantee that the above procedure will yield any MFG solution since Step
1 may have multiple solutions. Moreover, by the nature of relaxed controls, the potential fixed
point(s) would be the fixed point(s) of a set-valued map as described in [15]. Nevertheless, with
specific solution structures from Step 1, one can build proper verification argument to show that
the explicit fixed-point solution is indeed a solution to the MFG problem (2.7).
NE Derivation of (MFG-SE). To ease the exposition, we drop the subscript SE.
Proof of Theorem 2. For a given admissible policy pi ∈ A, the forward equation for p(s, x), the
density of Xs, is given by,
∂sp(s, x) = −∂x
((
A(ms − x) +B
∫
R
upis(u;x)du
)
p(s, x)
)
+
1
2
∂xx
(
p(s, x)
∫
R
D2u2 pis(u;x)du
)
,
with initial density p(t, x) = ν(x). Here, ms =
∫
xp(s, x)dx, s ∈ [t, T ].
We will first proceed heuristically with an associated HJB equation, derive its solution, and then
validate this solution through a verification step.
The HJB equation for the value function V˜ (s, x) can be written as
−∂sV˜ (s, x) = max
pis∈P(R)
((
A(ms − x) +B
∫
R
upi(u; s, x)du
)
V˜x(s, x) (3.15)
−Q
2
(ms − x)2 − λSE
∫
R
pis(u;x) lnpis(u;x)du+
1
2
(∫
R
D2u2pis(u;x)du
)
∂xxV˜ (s, x)
)
.
with terminal condition V˜ (T, x) = −Q2 (mT − x)2. Recall that pis(u;x) ∈ P(U) if and only if (2.1)
holds. Solving the constrained maximization problem on the right hand side of (3.15) yields
pi∗s(u;x) =
exp
(
1
λSE
(
−Q2 (x−ms)2 + 12D2u2∂xxV˜ + (A(ms − x) +Bu)V˜x
))
∫
R exp
(
1
λSE
(
−Q2 (x−ms)2 + 12D2u2∂xxV˜ + (A(ms − x) +Bu)V˜x
))
du
.
Thus, the optimal policy is expected to be Gaussian with mean B∂xV˜−D2∂xxV˜ and variance
λSE
−D2∂xxV˜ ,
where it is for now assumed (and will be later verified) that ∂xxV˜ < 0, i.e.,
pi∗s(u;x) = N
(
B∂xV˜
−D2∂xxV˜
,
λSE
−D2∂xxV˜
)
.
Therefore,∫
R
upi∗s(u;x)du =
B∂xV˜
−D2∂xxV˜
and
∫
R
u2pi∗s(u;x)du =
(
B∂xV˜
−D2∂xxV˜
)2
+
λSE
−D2∂xxV˜
.
Next we introduce the ansatz
V˜ (s, x) = −ηs
2
(ms − x)2 + γs. (3.16)
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with ηs > 0. Then, ∂xV˜ = −ηs(x−ms) and ∂xxV˜ = −ηs, and thus,∫
R
upi∗s(u;x)du =
B(ms − x)
D2
,
and ∫
R
u2pi∗s(u;x)du =
(
B(ms − x)
D2
)2
+
λSE
D2ηs
.
Denoting κ = B
D2
and plugging in the forward equation for p(s, x) yield
∂sp(s, x) = −∂x [((A+Bκ)(ms − x)) p(s, x)]
+
1
2
D2∂xx
((
κ2(ms − x)2 + λSE
D2ηs
)
p(s, x)
)
,
= (A+Bκ) p(s, x)− ((A+Bκ)(ms − x)) ∂xp(s, x)
+
1
2
D2
(
2κ2p(s, x) + 4κ2(x−ms)∂xp(s, x)
)
+
1
2
D2
((
κ2(ms − x)2 + λSE
D2ηs
)
∂xxp(s, x)
)
.
Multiplying by x and integrating with respect to x show that dms =
{∫
x∂sp(s, dx)
}
ds = 0.
Therefore, m∗s = Eξ∼ν [ξ] =: m∗. Furthermore, the HJB equation for s ∈ [t, T ) is reduced to
−∂sV˜ (s, x) = max
pis∈P(R)
((
A(m∗ − x) +B
∫
R
upis(u;x)du
)
∂xV˜ (s, x) (3.17)
−Q
2
(m∗ − x)2 − λSE
∫
R
pis(u;x) lnpis(u;x)du+
1
2
D2
(∫
R
u2pis(u;x)du
)
∂xxV˜ (s, x)
)
.
with V˜ (T, x) = −Q2 (m∗ − x)2. Plugging pi∗s(u;x) and using ansatz (3.16), with ms = m∗, into the
above HJB give
η˙s
2
(x−m∗)2 − γ˙s = −
(
A(m∗ − x) + B
2(m∗ − x)
D2
)
ηs(x−m∗)
− Q
2
(m∗ − x)2 + λSE ln
(√
2pieλSE
D2ηs
)
− 1
2
D2
((
B(m∗ − x)
D2
)2
+
λSE
D2ηs
)
ηs.
Direct calculations imply
η˙s =
(
2A+
B2
D2
)
ηs −Q (3.18)
with ηT = Q¯, and
γ˙s = −λSE
2
ln
(
2piλSE
D2
)
+
λSE
2
ln(ηs) (3.19)
with γT = 0. Then, (3.18) admits the unique solution
ηs = Q¯ exp
(
−
(
2A+
B2
D2
)
(T − s)
)
+
Q
2A+ B
2
D2
(
1− exp
(
−
(
2A+
B2
D2
)
(T − s)
))
,
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from which it is easy to verify that ηs > 0 since A > 0, Q > 0 and Q¯ > 0, s ∈ [t, T ]. Moreover,
(3.19) admits the unique solution
γs =
λSE
2
ln
(
2piλSE
D2
)
(T − s)−
∫ T
s
λSE
2
ln(ηz)dz.
Consequently, the NE (optimal) policy takes the form
pi∗s(u;x) = N
(
B(m∗ − x)
D2
,
λSE
D2ηs
)
,
and the associated optimal state process is the unique solution of the SDE (3.4).
Verification argument. The final step is to verify that m∗ is the mean state under policy (3.3)
and V ∗(t) := Eξ∼ν [V˜ (ξ, t)] = Eξ∼ν [ηt2 (ξ −m∗)2 + γt] is the corresponding game value.
First, let us fix the mean field information as ms = m∗, s ∈ [t, T ], and also fix the initial state
x ∈ R and initial time t ∈ [0, T ]. Let pi ∈ A(x) and Xpi be the associated state process under pi
solving
dXpis =
(∫
R
(A(m∗ −Xpis ) +Bu)pis(u)du
)
ds+D
(√∫
R
u2pis(u)du
)
dWs.
Denote r˜(x, pi) = −Q2 (x−m∗)2, b˜(x, pi) =
∫
R(A(m
∗−x)+Bu)pis(u)du, and σ˜(x, pi) = D
(√∫
R u
2pi(u)du
)
.
Further, define the stopping time τpin :=
{
s ≥ t : ∫ Tt ∂xV˜ (t,Xpis )σ˜2(Xpis , pis)2ds ≥ n}, for n ≥ 1.
Then Itô’s formula yields
V˜ (T ∧ τpin , XpiT∧τpin )− V˜ (t, x) =
∫ T∧τpin
t
(
1
2
∂xxV˜ (s,X
pi
s )σ˜
2(Xpis , pis)
2 + ∂xV˜ (s,X
pi
s )b˜(X
pi
s , pis)
)
ds
+
∫ T∧τpin
t
∂xV˜ (X
pi
s )dWs.
Taking expectations, noting that V˜ solves the HJB equation (3.17), and that pi is sub-optimal, we
see
E
[
V˜ (T,XpiT∧τpin )
]
= V˜ (t, x) + E
[∫ T∧τpin
t
(
1
2
∂xxV˜ (s,X
pi
s )σ˜
2(Xpis , pis)
2 + ∂xV˜ (s,X
pi
s )b˜(X
pi
s , pis)
)
ds+
∫ T∧τpin
t
∂xV˜ (X
pi
s )dWs
]
≤ V˜ (t, x)− E
[∫ T∧τpin
t
(
r˜(Xpis , pis)− λ
∫
R
pis(u) lnpis(u)du
)
ds
]
.
Standard calculations yield E[supt≤s≤T |Xpis |2] ≤ N(1 + x2)eNT for some constant N > 0, which is
independent of n. Sending n→∞ yields
V˜ (t, x) ≥ E
[∫ T
t
(
r˜(Xpis , pis)− λ
∫
R
pis(u) lnpis(u)du
)
ds− Q¯
2
(XpiT −m∗)2
]
,
for each x ∈ R and pi ∈ A. Hence V˜ (t, x) ≥ V ∗(t, x), for all x ∈ R.
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On the other hand, the right-hand of (3.15) is maximized at the following policy,
pi∗s(u;x) = N
(
B(m∗ − x)
D2
,
λSE
D2ηs
)
.
Thus
V˜ (t, x) = E
[∫ T
0
(
r˜(X∗s , pis)− λ
∫
R
pi∗s(u;X
∗
s ) lnpi
∗
s(u;X
∗
s )du
)
ds− Q¯
2
(X∗T −m∗)2
]
,
where X∗t is the state process under policy process pi∗s(u;X∗t ). Hence, V˜ (t, x) is the optimal value
when the mean field information is fixed at ms = m∗, s ∈ [t, T ].
Next, let us show that
m∗ = E[X∗s ] for s ∈ [t, T ]
where X∗s is the controlled state process under the policy process
pi∗s(u;X
∗
s ) = N
(
B(m∗ −X∗s )
D2
,
λSE
D2ηs
)
.
To this end, denote K = −
(
A+ B
2
D2
)
. Then,
dX∗s = (KX
∗
s −Km∗)ds+ f(s,X∗s ,m∗)dWs,
with
f(s, x,m) =
√(B
D
(x−m)
)2
+
λSE
ηs
 .
Therefore,
e−K(s−t)X∗s = ξ +
∫ s
t
e−K(z−t) (−Km∗dz + f(z,X∗z ,m∗)dWz) ,
and e−K(s−t)E[X∗s ] = E[ξ] +
(
e−K(s−t) − 1
)
m∗. Hence, E[X∗s ] = m∗, s ∈ [t, T ].
NE Derivation of Game (MFG-EE). To ease the exposition, we drop the subscript EE.
Proof of Theorem 4. For a given Markovian policy pis(u;x), the forward equation for p(s, x), the
density of Xs, s ∈ [t, T ] satisfies
∂sp(s, x) = −∂x
((
A(ms − x) +B
∫
R
upis(u;x)du
)
p(s, x)
)
+
1
2
∂xx
(
p(s, x)
∫
R
D2u2pis(u;x)du
)
,
with initial density p(t, x) = ν(x) and ms =
∫
xp(s, x)dx.
The HJB equation for the value function V˜ (s, x,m) can be written as
−∂sV˜ (s, x) = max
pis∈P(R)
([
A(ms − x) +B
∫
R
udpis(u;x)
]
∂xV˜ (s, x)− Q
2
(ms − x)2
−λCE
∫
R
pis(u;x)
∫
lnαs(u;x)µs(dx)du− λSE
∫
R
pis(u;x) lnpis(u;x)du
+
1
2
(∫
R
D2u2pis(u;x)du
)
∂xxV˜ (s, x)
)
,
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with V˜ (T, x) = − Q¯2 (x −mT )2. Recall that pis ∈ P(U) if and only if (2.1) holds. The constrained
maximization problem on the right hand side of (3.15) yields
pi∗s (u;x) =
exp
(
1
λSE
(
−Q2 (x−ms)2 + 12D2u2∂xxV˜ + (A(ms − x) +Bu)∂xV˜ − λCE
∫ (
lnαs(u;x)
)
µs(dx)
))
∫
R exp
(
1
λSE
(
−Q2 (x−ms)2 + 12D2u2∂xxV˜ + (A(ms − x) +Bu)∂xV˜ − λCE
∫ (
lnαs(u;x)
)
µs(dx)
))
du
.
Next, let us introduce the ansatz for the population action distribution for the agent in state y,
αs(u; y) = N (u |Hs(y −ms), Ls) (3.20)
with some deterministic processes Hs and Ls, s ∈ [t, T ]. Then, αs(u; y) is Gaussian with mean
Hs(y −ms) and variance Ls > 0. We stress that the Gaussian property of αs(u; y) does not imply
the Gaussian property of the aggregated population action distribution α˜(s) =
∫
αs(u; y)µs(dy).
In turn, lnαs(u; y) = −12 ln(2piLs)− 12Ls (u−Hs(y −ms))2 and∫
µs(dy) ln(αs(u; y)) = −1
2
ln(2piLs)− 1
2Ls
∫
(u−Hs(y −ms))2µt(dy)
= −1
2
ln(2piLs)− 1
2Ls
(u2 +H2sVar(µs)),
with Var(µs) =
∫
x2µs(dx) − (
∫
xµs(dx))
2. Therefore, the optimal policy is Gaussian with mean
B∂xV˜
−D2∂xxV˜−λCELs
and variance λSE−D2∂xxV˜−λCELs
, i.e.,
pi∗s(u;x) = N
(
u
∣∣∣∣∣ B∂xV˜−D2∂xxV˜ − λCELs ,
λSE
−D2∂xxV˜ − λCELs
)
.
Let us for now assume (and verify later) that −D2∂xxV˜ − λCELs > 0.
Hence, ∫
R
upi∗s(u;x)du =
B∂xV˜
−D2∂xxV˜ − λCELs
,
and ∫
R
u2pi∗s(u;x)du =
(
B∂xV˜
−D2∂xxV˜ − λCELs
)2
+
λSE
−D2∂xxV˜ − λCELs
.
Next, consider the ansatz
V˜ (s, x) = −ηs
2
(ms − x)2 + γs. (3.21)
In turn, ∂xV˜ = −ηs(x−ms) and ∂xxV˜ = −ηs, together with∫
R
upi∗s(u;x)du =
Bηs(ms − x)
D2ηs − λCELs
,
and ∫
R
u2pi∗s(u;x)du =
(
Bηs(ms − x)
D2ηs − λCELs
)2
+
λSE
D2ηs − λCELs
.
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Denoting κs := Bηs
D2ηs−λCELs
, s ∈ [t, T ], and plugging in the forward equation for p(s, x), we deduce
that
∂sp(s, x) = −∂x ((A+Bκs)(ms − x)p(s, x))
+
1
2
D2∂xx
((
κ2t (ms − x)2 +
λSE
D2ηs − λCELs
)
p(s, x)
)
= (A+Bκs) p(t, x)− ((A+Bκs)(ms − x)) ∂xp(s, x)
+
1
2
D2
(
2κ2sp(s, x) + 4κ
2
s(x−ms)∂xp(s, x)
)
+
1
2
D2
((
κ2s(ms − x)2 +
λSE
D2ηs − λCELs
)
∂xxp(s, x)
)
.
Multiplying by x and integrating with respect to x give ∂sms =
∫
x∂sp(s, dx) = 0 and, thus,
m∗s = m∗ = Eξ∼ν [ξ], for t ≤ s ≤ T . Hence, the HJB equation reduces to
−∂sV˜ (s, x) = maxpis∈P(R)
((
A(m∗ − x) +B ∫R udpis(u)) ∂xV˜ (s, x)− Q2 (m∗ − x)2
−λSE
∫
R pis(u) lnpis(u)du− λCE
∫
R pis(u)
∫
µs(dy) lnαs(u; y)dydu
+12D
2
∫
R u
2pis(u)du∂xxV˜ (s, x)
)
.
Plugging pi∗s(u;x) and ansatz (3.21) with ms = m∗ into the above HJB, we obtain
η˙s
2
(x−m∗)2 − γ˙s = −
(
A(m∗ − x) +BBηs(m
∗ − x)
D2ηs − λCELs
)
ηs(x−m∗) + λSE ln
(√
2pieλSE
D2ηs − λCELs
)
− 1
2
D2
((Bηs)(m∗ − x)
D2ηs − λCELs
)2
+
λSE
D2ηs − λCELs
 ηs − Q
2
(m∗ − x)2
+
λCE
2
ln(2piLs) +
λCE
2Ls
(Bηs(m∗ − x)
D2ηs − λCELs
)2
+
λSE
D2ηs − λCELs

+
λCE
2Ls
H2sVar(µs).
Direct calculations yield
η˙s = 2Aηs +
(Bηs)
2
D2ηs − λCELs
−Q, (3.22)
γ˙s =
λSE
2
− λSE ln
(√
2pieλSE
D2ηs − λCELs
)
− λCE
2
ln (2piLs)− λCE
2Ls
H2sVar(µs). (3.23)
Setting
Ls =
λSE
D2ηs − λCELs
and Hs =
−Bηs
D2ηs − λCELs
,
we deduce
Hs = − B
D2
λSE + λCE
λSE
and Ls =
λSE + λCE
D2ηs
,
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η˙s = 2Aηs +
B2ηs
D2
λSE + λCE
λSE
−Q, (3.24)
γ˙s = −λSE + λCE
2
ln
(
2pi(λSE + λCE)
D2ηs
)
− λCE
2
B2ηs(λSE + λCE)
D2λ2SE
Var(µs). (3.25)
Consequently,
pi∗s(u;x) = N
(
u
∣∣∣∣ BD2 λSE + λCEλSE (m∗ − x), λSE + λCED2ηs
)
.
Denote −K = (A+B B
D2
)
λSE+λCE
λSE
and
f(s, x,m) =
√(B
D
λSE + λCE
λSE
(x−m)
)2
+
λSE + λCE
ηs
 .
In turn,
dX∗s = (KX
∗
s −Km∗)ds+ f(s,X∗s ,m∗)dWs,
and
d(e−K(s−t)X∗s ) = −Ke−K(s−t)X∗sds+ e−K(s−t)dX∗s
= −Ke−K(s−t)X∗sds+ e−K(s−t)((KX∗s −Km∗)ds+ f(s,X∗s ,m∗)dWs)
= e−K(s−t)(−Km∗ds+ f(s,X∗s ,m∗)dWs).
Therefore,
e−K(s−t)X∗s = ξ +
∫ s
t
e−K(z−t)(−Km∗dz + f(z,X∗z ,m∗)dWz), (3.26)
and
e−2K(s−t)Var[X∗s ] = Var[ξ] + E
[(∫ s
t
e−K(z−t)f(z,X∗z ,m
∗)dWz
)2]
.
By Itô’s isometry,
E
[(∫ s
t
e−K(z−t)f(z,X∗z ,m
∗)dWz
)2]
= E
[∫ s
t
e−2K(z−t)f2(z,X∗z ,m
∗)dz
]
= E
[∫ s
t
e−2K(z−t)
((
B
D
λSE + λCE
λSE
(X∗z −m∗)
)2
+
λSE + λCE
ηz
)
dz
]
=
∫ s
t
e−2K(z−t)
((
B
D
λSE + λCE
λSE
)2
Var[X∗z ] +
λSE + λCE
ηz
)
dz.
Let
y(s) = e−2K(s−t)Var[X∗s ],
M =
(
B
D
λSE + λCE
λSE
)2
and b(s) = e−2K(s−t)
λSE + λCE
ηs
.
Thus,
y(s) = eM(s−t)
(
y(t) +
∫ s
t
e−M(z−t)b(z)dz
)
,
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and
e−2K(s−t)Var(X∗s ) = e
M(s−t)
[
Var(ξ) +
∫ s
t
e−(M+2K)(z−t)
λSE + λCE
ηz
dz
]
.
Therefore,
Var[X∗s ] = e
(2K+M)(s−t)Var[ξ] + e2K(s−t)
∫ s
t
eM(s−z)b(z)dz
= e(2K+M)(s−t)Var[ξ] +
∫ s
t
e(M+2K)(s−z)
λSE + λCE
ηz
dz. (3.27)
Assuming for the moment that ηs > 0, s ∈ [t, T ], hence Var[X∗s ] is well-defined. Hence (3.25)
reduces to
γ˙s = −λSE + λCE
2
ln
(
2pi(λSE + λCE)
D2
)
+
λSE + λCE
2
ln ηs − λCE
2
B2ηs(λSE + λCE)
D2λ2SE
κs, (3.28)
with γT = 0, where κs, s ∈ [t, T ],
κs := e
(M+2K)(s−t)Var[ξ] +
∫ s
t
e(M+2K)(s−z)
λSE + λCE
ηz
dz (3.29)
with
K = −
(
A+B
B
D2
)
λSE + λCE
λSE
and M = D2
(
B
D2
λSE + λCE
λSE
)2
.
Therefore, equation (3.24) admits the unique solution
ηs = Q¯ exp
(
−
(
2A+
B2
D2
λSE + λCE
λSE
)
(T − s)
)
+
Q
2A+ B
2
D2
λSE+λCE
λSE
(
1− exp
(
−
(
2A+
B2
D2
λSE + λCE
λSE
)
(T − s)
))
.
We easily deduce that ηs > 0, s ∈ [t, T ], since Q¯ > 0, Q > 0 and A > 0.
Moreover, (3.28) admits the solution
γs =
λSE + λCE
2
(T − s) ln
(
2pi(λSE + λCE)
D2
)
−
∫ T
s
λSE + λCE
2
ln(ηz)dz
+
∫ T
s
λCE
2
B2ηz(λSE + λCE)
D2λ2SE
κzdz.
The associated optimal policy is given by
pi∗s(u;x) = N
(
λSE + λCE
λSE
B(m∗ − x)
D2
,
λSE + λCE
D2ηs
)
, (3.30)
and that the optimal controlled state process is the unique solution of the SDE (3.13). The verifi-
cation is similar to the verification of Theorem 2 and is therefore skipped here.
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Proof of Corollary 3.1
Proof. Let K̂ := −
(
A+BM̂
)
and f
(
ms, Xs, M̂ , σ̂
2
s
)
:= D
√
M̂2(ms −Xs)2 + σ̂2s , s ∈ [t, T ].
Then, under policy pi (3.6),
dXpis =
((
A+BM̂
)
ms −
(
A+BM̂
)
Xpis
)
ds+ f
(
ms, X
pi
s , M̂ , σ̂
2
s
)
dWs
= −K̂msds+KXpis ds+ fdWs.
Using that d(e−K̂sXpis ) = e−K̂s
(
−K̂msds+ f dWs
)
, we have
e−K̂(s−t)Xpis = ξ +
∫ s
t
e−K̂(z−t)(−K̂mzdz + f dWz). (3.31)
Hence,
E[Xpis ] = eK̂(s−t)E[ξ]−
∫ s
t
eK̂(s−z)K̂mz dz.
Denote this updated mean field information flow as m̂s := E[Xpis ].
From (3.31) and routine calculations, we have
e−2K̂(s−t)
(
Xpis
)2
= ξ2 + 2ξ
∫ s
t
e−K̂(z−t)(−K̂mzdz + f dWz) +
(∫ s
t
e−K̂(z−t)K̂mzdz
)2
+
(∫ s
t
e−K̂(z−t)f dWz
)2
− 2
∫ s
t
e−K̂(z−t)K̂mzdz
∫ s
t
e−K̂(z−t)f dWz.
Hence,
e−2K̂(s−t)E
[(
Xpis
)2]
= E[ξ2]− 2E[ξ]
∫ s
t
e−K̂(z−t)K̂mzdz +
(∫ s
t
e−K̂(z−t)K̂mzdz
)2
+ E
(∫ s
t
e−K̂(z−t)f dWz
)2
.(3.32)
By Itô’s isometry,
E
(∫ s
t
e−K̂(z−t)f dWz
)2
= E
[∫ s
t
e−2K̂(z−t)f2 dz
]
= E
[∫ s
t
e−2K̂(z−t)D2
(
M̂2
(
mz −Xpiz
)2
+ σ̂2z
)
dz
]
= E
[∫ s
t
e−2K̂(z−t)D2M̂2
(
m2z − 2mzXpiz +
(
Xpiz
)2)
dz +
∫ s
t
e−2K(z−t)D2σ̂2zdz
]
= E
[∫ s
t
e−2K̂(z−t)D2M̂2
(
Xpiz
)2
dz
]
+
∫ s
t
e−2K̂(z−t)D2
(
M̂2m2z − 2M̂2mzm̂z + σ̂2z
)
dz
= D2M̂2
∫ s
t
e−2K̂(z−t)E
[(
Xpiz
)2]
dz +
∫ s
t
e−2K̂(z−t)D2
(
M̂2m2z − 2M̂2mzm̂z + σ̂2z
)
dz(3.33)
Combining (3.32) and (3.33) yields
e−2K(s−t)E
[(
Xpis
)2]
= E[ξ2]− 2E[ξ]
∫ s
t
e−K̂(z−t)K̂mzdz +
(∫ s
t
e−K̂(z−t)K̂mzdz
)2
+D2M̂2
∫ s
t
e−2K̂(z−t)E
[(
Xpiz
)2]
dz +
∫ s
t
e−2K̂(z−t)D2
(
M̂2m2z − 2M̂2mzm̂z + σ̂2z
)
dz.
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Denoting ys = e−2K̂(s−t)E
[(
Xpis
)2], we have
ys − yt = bs +D2M̂2
∫ s
t
yzdz,
where, for s ∈ [t, T ],
bs := −2E[ξ]
∫ s
t
e−K̂(z−t)K̂mzdz+
(∫ s
t
e−K̂(z−t)K̂mzdz
)2
+
∫ s
t
e−2K̂(z−t)D2
(
M̂2m2z − 2M̂2mzm̂z + σ̂2z
)
dz,
with bt = 0. Therefore, ∫ s
t
y˙zdz =
∫ s
t
b˙zdz +D
2M̂2
∫ s
t
yzdz
and
ys = e
D2M̂2(s−t)
(
yt +
∫ s
t
e−D
2M̂2(z−t)b˙(z)dz
)
.
Finally,
E
[(
Xpis
)2]
= e(2K̂+D
2M̂2)(s−t)
(
E[ξ2] +
∫ s
t
e−D
2M̂2(z−t)b˙(z)dz
)
with, for s ∈ [t, T ],
b˙(s) = −2E[ξ] e−K̂(s−t)K̂ms +
(∫ s
t
e−K̂(z−t)K̂mzdz
)
e−K̂(s−t)K̂ms
+e−2K̂(s−t)D2
(
M̂2m2s − 2M̂2msm̂s + σ̂2s
)
.
Setting φ2s := E
[(
Xpis
)2] and d(s) := b˙(s), the rest of the proof follows easily.
4 Experiment
We now demonstrate how the theoretical results of Theorems 2 and 4 can be used to design algo-
rithms for MFG with learning. The experiment aims to highlight
• how entropy regularization helps to “explore optimally” in a game with learning, and especially
in improving the speed of convergence to the NE, and
• how the agent manages to eventually learn the optimal scheduling of the exploration and, in
particular, the time-dependent variances (as in (3.3) and (3.12)) over a finite time horizon.
Throughout this section, the experiment is with the inclusion of Shannon entropy only, as the case
with the additional cross-entropy may be studied in a similar fashion.
4.1 Set-up
The algorithm design is with discrete time steps s = 0, 1, 2, · · · , N, where δ = TN is the step-size.
According to Theorem 2 and Corollary 3.1, it suffices to focus on a considerably smaller class of
policies of form
pis ∼ N
(
M̂(xs −ms), σ̂2s
)
,
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which can be fully characterized by the mean state process m := {ms}Ns=0 and R̂ := (M̂, σ̂2), with
σ̂2 := {σ̂2s}Ns=0. We, then, consider the discrete-time LQ-MFG problem
J
(
R̂,m
)
:= E
[
N−1∑
s=0
(
(xs −ms)2 + λSEHSE(pis)
)
δ − Q
2
(XN −mN )2
]
, (4.1)
where, for s = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1,
xs+1 = xs +
(∫
R
(A(ms −Xs) +Bu)pis(u)du
)
δ +
(
D
√∫
R
u2pis(u)du
)
∆Ws, x0 = ξ ∼ ν. (4.2)
Here, ∆Ws are IID N (0, δ) random variables and ν is the distribution of the initial state ξ.
4.2 Mean Field Policy Gradient with Exploration
Recall that in the learning setting, the model parameters A, B, D, Q, and Q¯ are assumed to be
unknown to the agent. She only has access to the simulated reward function
ĵ
(
R̂,m
)
:=
N−1∑
s=0
(
(xs −ms)2 + λSEHSE(pis)
)
δ − Q
2
(XN −mN )2,
which is associated with a single trajectory {xs}Ns=0 under the policy characterized by R̂ and the
mean state process m = {ms}Ns=0. Note, however, that this assumption is weaker than being able
to observe J
(
R̂,m
)
defined in (4.1), as J
(
R̂,m
)
involves calculating an expectation and requiring
observing infinite number of samples.
The algorithm has the following key elements:
• Information adaptiveness. In each outer iteration k k = 1, 2, · · · ,K, the representative agent
can improve her decision (lines 4-11) based on the mean field information mk−1 from the
previous outer iteration k − 1. This implies that she has access to a simulator with which
she may excercise different policies when other agents keep applying the same policy from the
previous outer iteration. This is a standard assumption, see, for example, see [7, 9]. Once
the agent stops improving her policy, the mean field information is updated assuming that
all agents follow the same improved policy (line 12). In the RL literature, this procedure is
sometimes called self play.
• Agent update. Within each outer iteration k under a fixed mean field information mk−1, the
agent will update her estimation of the optimal policy R̂ for I rounds (lines 4-11). Each round
corresponds to one gradient descent step (line 10) and requires n samples of the simulated
reward function (line 7) associated with the perturbed version of R̂i (line 6).
• The gradient term ∇J(R̂i,mk−1) in (4.3) is estimated using a zeroth-order optimization ap-
proach (line 9). That is, the agent only has query access to a sample of the reward function
ĵ(·) at input points (R,m), without querying the gradients and higher order derivatives of ĵ(·).
Moreover, to avoid the issue of ill-definedness of EU∼N (0,σ2I)[J(R̂ + U,m)] with a Gaussian
smoothing, we choose Sr by smoothing over the sphere of a ball; hence, step (4.3) in Algorithm
1 is to find, for a given m, a bounded and biased estimate ̂∇J(R̂,m) of ∇J(R̂,m).
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Algorithm 1 Mean Field Policy Gradient with Exploration
1: Input: Initial beliefs m0 := {m0s}Ns=0, distribution of initial policy D, number of trajectories n,
smoothing parameter r, learning rate η.
2: for k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} do
3: Sample initial policy R̂0 ∼ D.
4: for i ∈ {0, . . . , I} do
5: for j ∈ {1, . . . , n} do
6: Sample policy R̂i,j = R̂i + U i,j where U i,j is drawn uniformly at random over matrices
such that ‖U i,j‖F = r.
7: Denote ĵ
(
R̂i,j ,mk−1
)
as the single trajectory cost with policy R̂i,j starting from xi,j0 ∼ ν
under fixed mean state mk−1.
8: end for
9: Obtain the estimate of ∇J(R̂i,mk−1):
̂∇J(R̂i,mk−1) = 1
n
n∑
j=1
1
r2
ĵ
(
R̂i,j ,mk−1
)
U j . (4.3)
10: Perform policy gradient descent step:
R̂i+1 = R̂i − η ̂∇J(R̂i,mk−1). (4.4)
11: end for
12: Update mean field information mk = {mks}Ns=0 assuming all agents follow policy R̂I .
13: end for
4.3 Results
Model set-up. We take T = 0.1, ∆ = 0.02, A = 2.0, B = 3.0, D = 2.0, Q = 3.0, Q¯ = 2.0,
E[ξ] = 0.1, and E[ξ2] = 1.
Experiment set-up. We choose r = 0.01 and η = 0.05. Initializationm0s = 0.0 (s = 0, 1, · · · , N),
M̂0 ∼ N (0.5, 1), and σ̂0s ∼ N (0.5, 0.1) (s = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1), with K = 10, n = 50, and I = 400.
Performance evaluation. Given policy R̂ and mean field informationm, define the relative error
between (R̂,m) and the mean field solution (R∗,m∗) of problem (4.1)-(4.2) as
Err(R̂,m) :=
|J(R̂,m)− J(R∗,m∗)|
|J(R∗,m∗)| . (4.5)
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(a) {Vs}Ns=0 (b) {ms}Ns=0 (c) Relative error in total
iterations.
(d) Relative error in outer
iterations
Figure 1: Performance of the algorithm when λSE = 1.0. (True M = 0.75 and learned M̂ = 0.732.)
(a) {Vs}Ns=0 (b) {ms}Ns=0 (c) Relative error in total
iterations.
(d) Relative error in outer
iterations
Figure 2: Performance of the algorithm when λSE = 3.0, with true M = 0.75 and learned M̂ =
0.736.
Figure 3: Comparison of relative errors with different λSE .
Results.
1. Stability. As seen from Figure 3, when λSE = 0, i.e., when there is no exploration, the
algorithms is unstable. Within each outer iteration, errors fluctuate when the representative
agent updates her policy under a fixed mean field information. At the end of each outer
iteration, there is a sudden jump in error when the population updates their mean field
policy. In contrast, the algorithm is stable when exploration is included, i.e., when λSE > 0.
2. Speed of convergence. As clear from Figures 1b and 2b, Shannon entropy (λSE > 0) improves
the speed of convergence to the mean field equilibrium. In fact, the algorithm does not
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converge without entropy regularization, i.e., when λSE = 0; whereas the algorithm converges
to the equilibrium solution when λSE = 1 and λSE = 3. Moreover, the convergence speed
is faster with λSE = 3 than with λSE = 1, with the former converging to the mean field
equilibrium within three outer iterations and the latter in five outer iterations.
3. Accuracy of learned mean field equilibrium. Figures 1b and 2b show consistency with The-
orems 2 and 4. The algorithm is able to learn the mean field information with small errors
(< 5%) for both λSE = 1 and λSE = 3.
4. Learning optimal scheduling of the exploration policy. With given parameters, the variance
of the Guassian mean field policy (a.k.a., the optimal exploration scheduling) is a decreasing
function of time t for both λSE = 1 and λSE = 3. Figures 1a and 2a suggest that the agent
can learn this decreasing function {σ̂2s}Ts=0 with small errors (< 5%).
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